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Introduction
In the 19"' century, Americans in search of opportunity looked west-
ward toward the Pacific Ocean. Settlers traveled the Oregon Trail finding a
land unencumbered and uncluttered by excessive regulation: the "Wild
West."1 Today's Wild West is the Internet. Instead of the Oregon Trail we
have the electronic superhighway.
Limitless opportunities abound on the Internet, and the laissez-faire
freedom of electronic transactions hastens the development and growth of
the Internet. Currently, an estimated three hundred million people use the
Internet worldwide.2 These electronic settlers are a force that nations seek
to control, but cyberspace3 is a vacuum that abhors regulation.
Because of this regulatory vacuum, nations fear the Internet, for while
the Internet harbors enormous potential for access to information, it also
poses a threat to state sovereignty and traditional state boundaries. Nations
and governments cannot effectively regulate that which has no boundaries
and no physical presence, can disseminate information globally in an
instant, and seemingly exits everywhere, yet is located nowhere.
Nations seek to fence in the Internet using rules and regulations. Nev-
ertheless, governments bent on regulating the Internet face several practi-
cal problems. With whom does one negotiate? Who is paying attention to
the government's requests? Who will heed? Who really owns the Internet?
At least one group has expressed a desire for absolute Internet indepen-
dence, pronouncing the Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I
come from Cyberspace, the new home of the Mind. On behalf of the future, I
ask you of the past to leave me alone. You are not welcome among us. You
have no sovereignty where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address
you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always
speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally inde-
pendent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to
rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason -to
fear.4
1. See George P. Long, III, Who are you?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55
U. Pirr. L. REv. 1177, 1181 (1994).
2. See Nua Internet Surveys, How Many Online (posted Mar. 2000) <http://
www.nua.ie/surveys/how-many online/> [hereinafter Nua Survey].
3. Cyberspace is synonymous with the Internet.
4. John Perry Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (posted Feb. 8,
1996) <http://www.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html> (emphasis added). Barlow
co-founded the Electronic Frontier Foundation in 1990 to promote civil liberties in
cyberspace. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, New Foundation Established to Encourage
Computer-Based Communications Policies (visited Apr. 22, 2000) <http://www.eff.org/
pub/Misc/EFF/Historical/efffounded.announce>.
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The drive of nations to regulate the Internet and the natural tendency
of the Internet to frustrate such efforts is the focus of this Note, which
argues that nations should not attempt to regulate the Internet until the
medium stabilizes. Neither private nor public Internet regulation is effec-
tive at this time, and Internet users can and probably will regulate them-
selves, especially when provided the proper incentive. This Note does not
argue that non-regulation of the Internet is beneficial, nor does it attempt
to identify all Internet content as acceptable. It merely analyzes and criti-
ques the regulatory attempts currently employed by leading nations and
adopts a "wait and see" approach.
Part I provides background information about the Internet and
describes the available methods of regulation. Part II discusses current reg-
ulatory attempts by the leading nations in Internet use: the United States,
Germany, and China. Part III explores the difficulties in regulating the
Internet, focusing on how these nations' attempts at regulation have failed.
Part IV demonstrates that in the face of its evolving technology and global
reach, the Internet should be left unregulated for now.
I. Background
A. History of the Internet
Nations seeking to regulate Internet activity must understand the
Internet's origins and the technology involved. By design, the Internet's
infrastructure is not centralized in any one location, but rather dispersed
globally. The Internet's origin and the circumstances of its development
are sources of difficulty for nations in conceptualizing and regulating the
electronic superhighway.
In 1958, President Eisenhower and the Department of Defense
founded the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)5 to unite the
United States' highest levels of research,6 protect U.S. communications
from catastrophic nuclear attack,7 and minimize computing costs.8 ARPA
adopted a "distributed network" model,9 which means the network would
connect stand-alone computers to each other and use them as a group,
instead of concentrating computing power in a single machine.10 Further-
5. ARPA is currently known as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA). See DARPA, ARPA-DARPA: The History of the Name (visited Apr. 22, 2000)
<http://www.arpa.mil/body/arpadarpa.html>.
6. See KA'nE HA1'ua & MATrUEW LYON, WHERE WizARms STAY Up LATE: THE ORIGINS
OF THE INTERNE 13-23 (1996).
7. See id. at 54-59; Michael A. Fixler, Cyberfinance: Regulating Banking on the
Internet, 47 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 81, 82-83 (1996).
8. See HAFNER & LYON, supra note 6, at 43-44.
9. See Michael A. Geist, The Reality of Bytes: Regulating Economic Activity in the Age
of the Internet, 73 WASH. L. REv. 521, 527 (1998); see also HAFNER & LYON, supra note 6,
at 56-59.
10. See HAFNER & LYON, supra note 6, at 44-45, 58-59. Attempting to accomplish its
goals, ARPA discovered a national shortage of computer equipment in the 1960s. See id.
at 43-44. To use the existing computers while minimizing costs and maximizing effi-
ciency, ARPA proposed operating the available computers on a network. See id. at 44-45,
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more, on a distributed network model, attacking one computer would do
little damage, if any, to the overall network.'1 Finally, to improve the secur-
ity of electronic mail (e-mail) and other transmissions sent over the net-
work, ARPA used packet switching, which allowed network messages to be
broken into smaller components (packets) and transmitted piecemeal to
their destination.12
By 1969, the government had installed ARPA's network at four loca-
tions: the Univergity of California at Los Angeles, Stanford University, the
University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Utah.13
Later installations followed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Harvard University, Case Western Reserve University, and Carnegie Mel-
lon University. 14 Initially, researchers at these institutions used the net-
work to facilitate communication with each other. 15
In 1972, the wealth of information available on ARPA's network
expanded significantly with the creation of the Transmission Control Pro-
tocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). 16 While the Internet formerly transmit-
ted communications only by writing and re-writing to the network, TCP/IP
allowed the exchange of data without modifying the network. 17 Further-
more, TCP/IP enabled each computer to find other networked computers
via global addressing, using numbers, not geographic location, to denote
network addresses.' 8 With these refinements, e-mail became the most pop-
ular use for the network. 19
The next major change for ARPA's network occurred in 1989. Tim
Berners-Lee, a researcher at the CERN atomic research center in Switzer-
land, proposed a set of software commands that established a user-friendly
"point-and-click" system for browsing documents.20 This new set of com-
58-59. However, since a central hub for the entire network would be vulnerable to attack,
ARPA adopted the distributed network model. See Geist, supra note 9, at 527.
11. See Geist, supra note 9, at 527.
12. See HAFNER & LYON, supra note 6, at 59-61. The recipient's computer would reas-
semble the packets into a coherent whole. See id. This process enabled secure messaging
by prohibiting the interception of a complete message at any midpoint on the network.
See id.
13. See Barry M. Leiner et al., Internet Society, All About the Internet: A Brief History
of the Internet, at Origins of the Internet (last modified Feb. 20, 1998) <http://
www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.html>.
14. See HAFNER & LYON, supra note 6, at 166.
15. See Leiner, supra note 13, at Origins of the Internet.
16. See id. at The Initial Internetting Concepts.
17. See id. Writing and re-writing to the network is a laborious process, where a
computer would copy a message to the network and the recipient computer would
download it. Exchanging data between computers directly revolutionized message deliv-
ery. See id.
18. See id.
19. See HA~q4ER & LYON, supra note 6, at 194. An ARPA study found that in 1973,
roughly seventy-five percent of network use was e-mail. See id. Still the most common
use of the Internet, forty million people have sent e-mail as of 1995. See Fixler, supra
note 7, at 83.
20. See J. Neil Weintraut, Introduction to ROBERT H. REID, ARCHITECTS OF THE WEB:
1,000 DAYS THAT BUILT THE FUTURE oF BUSINESS xxiii-xxiv (1997). "Point-and-click" refers
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mands developed into Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML).2 1 Most
importantly, this language used "hyper-links" that would automatically
"jump" users to a new location when selected. 2 2
Researchers further refined Berners-Lee's innovation in 1993 by
improving Internet users' software and simplifying the browsing experi-
ence. 23 While most early browsers were primitive and unstable, advance-
ments in the understanding of HTML inspired Marc Andreeson at the
National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) to create the
Mosaic browser. 24 Using a graphical interface, Mosaic allowed users to
visually survey Internet sites. 25 Further refinements led to fairly sophisti-
cated programs like Netscape's Communicator and Microsoft's Internet
Explorer.
Today's Internet still reflects characteristics of the original ARPA net-
work; interconnected stand-alone computers give the appearance of a web,
hence the term "World Wide Web." There are currently an estimated three
hundred million Internet users worldwide.2 6 As of April 1995, there were
approximately 23,000 web sites on the Internet. 27 With the number of new
users roughly doubling every one and a half years, the Internet's growth is
astounding. 28
The rapidly growing size and widely-dispersed nature of the Internet
explain the challenges in regulation. Nations considering Internet regula-
tion must examine the changing technology and predict future evolution.
Static regulation will quickly be outdated as the Internet changes. Further-
more, the threat of regulation resembles a nuclear attack - a threat that
motivated ARPA to use a distributed information system for the Internet
that could not easily be compromised or shut down.2 9 Similar to a physical
threat, national regulation would attack only one geographical portion of
the Internet. However, due to the Internet's distributed nature, such attack
would have little effect on the Internet as a whole.
B. How the Internet can be Regulated
At a technical level, nations only have two options for actively regulat-
ing the Internet. First, the government can regulate the content of web
to using a mouse to graphically select an application or target and navigate the Internet.
See id.
21. See Tim Berners-Lee, Longer Bio for Tim Berners-Lee (visited Apr. 22, 2000)
<http://vww.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/Longer.html>.
22. See Weintraut, supra note 20, at xxii-xxiv.
23. See id. at xxv.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Nua Survey, supra note 2.
27. See Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Internet Payment Systems and the Cybercash
Approach, 452 PLI/PAT 123, 127-28 (1996).
28. See id. at 126; see also James Glave, Wired News, Dramatic Internet Growth Con-
tinues, (posted Feb. 16, 1998) <http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,10323,
00.html>.
29. See supra notes 7, 11 and accompanying text.
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sites.30 Second, the government can regulate user activity by controlling
citizens' access to the Internet.3 1
1. Regulation by Content
Due to the sheer breadth and scope of the Internet, true content regu-
lation by nations is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 32 Nations can
filter the content of web sites in two ways: hardware regulation and
software regulation.33 However, both methods suffer from inherent flaws.
a. Hardware Regulation
The information on the Internet is intangible and electronic; thus, in a
technical sense, impossible to regulate. However, instead of regulating the
information, regulations can seek to control the physical tools used to
access information.3 4 A nation's easiest response is to have nothing to do
with the Internet, technological isolation, foregoing all possible benefits of
connectivity.35 Although a radical solution, as of July 1996, thirty-three
countries had chosen this option.36 Alternatively, nations can create a hier-
archical network 3 7 and force outside Internet activity through a gateway
before allowing citizens to access it.38 The government could maintain and
regulate the gateway directly39 or regulate the Internet Service Providers
(ISPs)4 ° that provide access to the Internet.4 1
Unfortunately, these solutions would not be completely effective.
Users could avoid gateway restrictions simply by dialing into a "pure" ISP
for an unregulated feed to the Internet.42 However, this avoidance tech-
30. See Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty? - The Internet and the International
System, 10 HAv. J.L. & TECH. 647, 650-55 (1997).
31. See Wu, supra note 30, at 655-56.
32. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1370-76 (1996).
33. See Wu, supra note 30, at 651-55.
34. "Physical tools" refers to the tangible machinery used for Internet access. The
phrase include servers, computers, monitors, keyboards, etc.
35. See, e.g., Not Too Modern, Please: Asia and the Internet, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 16,
1996, at 42, available in 1996 WL 8671264 (discussing Asian countries' desire for the
fruits of connectivity, but also their concurrent wish to regulate it).
36. See Wu, supra note 30, at 651.
37. See id.
38. Conceptually, a gateway works like a funnel. All Internet information enters the
top of the funnel. As information flows through the funnel, the government removes any
information it does not want citizens to receive, which could include shutting off the
flow of information entirely. Thus, information emerges regulated at the bottom of the
funnel.
39. See infra Part IL.C (discussing China's Intranet).
40. Most users pay ISPs an hourly or monthly fee for access to the Internet. Access is
most commonly provided through telephone lines, but recent technological develop-
ments have allowed access through the cable television infrastructure and direct
Ethernet connections to the Internet's infrastructure.
41. See infra Parts II.B-C (discussing ISP liability in Germany and China).
42. See Wu, supra note 30, at 652. Ostensibly, a pure ISP could be found in a coun-
try with fewer content restrictions.
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nique is costly, and few citizens would have the requisite resources.43
b. Software Regulation
Instead of choosing to regulate the Internet through restrictive hard-
ware, nations could regulate through software.44 Software regulation could
be imposed at two stages:45 regulation at the router level and regulation at
the end-user level.46 To regulate at the router level, nations can establish a
"firewall" which filters out any unwanted sites or information. Using this
firewall, a government could prevent users from accessing all information
outside the firewall, except for government-approved sites.47 China, for
example, uses a firewall on a nationwide scale to protect and insulate data
from the rest of the Internet. 48
To regulate at the end-user level, a nation could filter the Internet
through the user's browser.49 The nation would need a rating system for
Internet sites. One example is the Platform for Internet Content Selection
(PICS).50 If web sites broadly adopted this protocol, any PICS-rated
browser would screen out inappropriate sites based on the rating.51 If a
government only permitted use of PICS-compatible browsers, that nation
could define undesirable content before allowing the end-user to access
information.
However, this system is not perfect. Users could avoid browsers that
screen objectionable sites,52 and "pirated browsers [without a screening
mechanism] would likely proliferate."53 Also, the system relies on web sites
to use the rating system accurately. 54
43. See id.
44. See id. at 652-55.
45. See id.
46. See id. The router level is the mediate stage between the sender and recipient
where information crosses the Internet. The end-user level is the final stage where the
user downloads information from the Internet.
47. To conceptualize a firewall, think of a medieval castle and moat. The moat pro-
tects the castle; with the drawbridge up, the moat restricts all access to the castle. When
the drawbridge is down, castle access is limited. A monarch regulates castle access by
controlling the drawbridge. In this example, the moat is a firewall, the outside world is
the Internet, and the castle and its contents are called an "Intranet." The drawbridge
would be the ISP that connects the Intranet and Internet. See John Wack & Lisa Carna-
han, Keeping your Site Comfortably Secure: An Introduction to Internet Firewalls (posted
Feb. 9, 1995) <http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/nistpubs/800-10/> (National Inst. of Standards
& Tech. Special Publication No. 800-10).
48. See infra Part II.C. Many U.S. corporations use a firewall to protect data within
the company. See generally Wack & Carnahan, supra note 47.
49. See Wu, supra note 30, at 653.
50. See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. LJ.
453 (1997).
51. See Wu, supra note 30, at 653.
52. See id. at 654.
53. Id.
54. See Weinberg, supra note 50, at 470.
Cornell International Law Journal
2. Regulation by User Activity
Regulation by content places the onus on the government to identify
information that citizens ought not see. After this initial designation, the
government can shield citizens by making access to undesirable sites
impossible. With this relatively heavy-handed approach, however, the
nation makes moral judgments for its citizens.5"
On the other hand, regulation by user activity allows the government
to exercise power more judiciously. Instead of technological solutions, reg-
ulation by user activity involves punishing behavior.56 For example,
instead of mandating that all browsers bar access to pornographic web
sites, the nation could enact legislation criminalizing the creation and/or
uploading57 of such web sites.5 8
There are benefits to this approach. Regulating by user activity simpli-
fies jurisdictional concerns. For example, regulations need not consider
the location of an undesirable web site's owner. If the web site's owner
resides in Germany, China, or elsewhere, a government would still retain
personal jurisdiction over the individual downloading the undesirable
material.
Nevertheless, this type of regulation fails to have a substantial impact
on individuals' conduct because the broad and decentralized nature of the
Internet makes enforcement difficult.5 9 Officials have considerable diffi-
culty locating individuals that access illegal web sites. Due to the relatively
cheap cost of using the Internet,60 every individual is a possible offender.
Therefore, while being the least intrusive into cyberspace, regulation by
user activity is also the least effective at obtaining results.
II. Current Regulatory Attempts
Many nations are only now investigating how best to cope with the
new technology of the Internet. Since the Internet has no geographical
55. A more tangible example of content regulation is banning books based on their
content. The government makes an initial determination of appropriate material for citi-
zens to read and bans all inappropriate books.
56. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994) (making the act of shipping, distributing, or
receiving child pornography illegal).
57. Uploading refers to copying files to a server so that any Internet user may access
them. In contrast, downloading refers to copying files from the Internet to a local
computer.
58. As a more specific example, the United States has neither mandated modifica-
tion of browsers to skip child pornography sites nor created a gateway to sift through
sites before offering them to its citizens. Instead, the United States makes it illegal to
upload child pornography to the World Wide Web. See, e.g., Child Pornography Protec-
tion Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (enlarging the
definition of child pornography and incorporating computer-generated images of child
pornography within the scope of the statute).
59. SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 32, at 1370-76. But see Wu, supra note 30, at 655-
56.
60. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INr'L LEaAL SUD.
155, 161 (1997).
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boundaries, national regulations have a profound international impact.6 1
With over three hundred million people62 in approximately 146 nations 63
accessing the Internet, national regulation is impractical, inconsistent, and
nearly impossible. While many nations are just beginning to understand
the effect of the Internet, the world's leading nations have sought to control
Internet content or, at the very least, access to the Internet. The United
States and China have established some of the most advanced regulatory
regimes, 64 while Germany has struggled with its own Internet dilemmas.
This section will explore the regulatory efforts in these nations for the later
purpose of analyzing why those efforts have failed.
A. The United States
The United States prides itself on its Constitution where freedom of
expression plays a primary role in ensuring democracy. According to the
Constitution, freedom of expression, manifests itself through free speech,
freedom of association, and freedom of religion.65 These basic principles
are implicated by activities on the Internet.66 Unfortunately, the United
States has little or no clear conception of how to reconcile constitutional
freedoms with Internet use.6 7 For example, the United States primarily has
targeted pornography as the greatest threat on the Internet. However, since
pornography strongly implicates the First Amendment, it is also the cor-
nerstone for U.S. difficulties in regulating the Internet. One of the first
nations to pass legislation governing Internet use, the United States Con-
gress passed the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). 68 Designed
to protect persons under the age of eighteen from exposure to indecent
online material, 69 the CDA included statutory good faith defenses for ISPs
61. See John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 HAuv.
INT'L L. J. 207, 208 (1997).
62. See Nua Survey, supra note 2.
63. See Delacourt, supra note 61, at 207.
64. See, e.g., Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h); Text of
Interim Internet Management Rules, XNHUA NEws AGENCY, Feb. 4, 1996, available in
National Technical Info. Service, World News Connection (visited Apr. 22, 2000) <http://
wnc.fedworld.gov> (translated by F.B.I.S.). See generally Delacourt, supra note 61.
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
66. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-81 (1997) (striking down two provisions of
the Communications Decency Act, but not adopting a medium-specific standard for
Internet speech).
67. See id.
68. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h). The CDA was included as Title V of the Federal Tele-
communications Act, which focused predominantly on reducing regulation and promot-
ing competition in local telephone and broadcast markets. See 47 U.S.C. § 223; see also
ACLU, 521 U.S. at 857-58.
69. The CDA barred the use of any telecommunications device to create or solicit
any "indecent" message. In addition, the CDA criminalized the use of an interactive com-
puter service to send minors any communication that would be patently offensive under
contemporary community standards, make such communications available to minors,
or intentionally allow telecommunications to be used for such a purpose. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(a)(1)(B), (d)(1)-(2).
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that sought to limit access by underage individuals. 70 The United States'
efforts to limit ISP liability contrast sharply with efforts of China and Ger-
many to impose liability on ISPs. 7 1
Yet, criticism leveled at the CDA argued that simple legislation was not
fluid enough to cope with the rapidly changing Internet.72 Congress would
be "unable to keep up with the frequent shifts in communications technol-
ogy and the resulting shifts in federal jurisprudence."73 Also, immediately
after the CDA's passage, twenty plaintiffs and the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) challenged two provisions of the CDA as unconstitutional
violations of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.74 Upon review by the Supreme Court, the majority in Reno v.
ACLU found the CDA's terms, "indecent" and "patently offensive," uncon-
stitutionally overbroad and vague.75 While the Court rejected the CDA pro-
visions related to indecent and patently offensive language, no parties
challenged the CDA provisions restricting child pornography or
obscenity.76
However, the United States has attempted other means of regulation,
most notably voluntary regulation by content through software pro-
grams. 77 Designed to restrict access to web sites with objectionable con-
tent, one example of a content-based self-regulatory program is
CyberPatrol. 78 CyberPatrol and similar programs maintain a list of web
sites with objectionable content. 79 Once activated, CyberPatrol prevents the
user from accessing sites on the list.80 Designed to shield children from
objectionable content, CyberPatrol has been used extensively in Boston,
where Mayor Thomas Menino and the Boston Public Library installed the
program on all computers available to minors.81 Unfortunately, CyberPa-
trol and similar programs tend toward overbroad application, inexplicably
restricting some web sites.8 2
Some ISPs, like America Online, also include parental controls that
70. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(c). This provision protected corporations that attempted to
screen out underage users using age verification techniques, most commonly by requir-
ing credit card numbers. See, e.g., Adult Check, Adult Check: Webmaster Info (visited Apr.
22, 2000) <http://www.adultcheck.com/cgi-bin/merchant.cgi?9999>.
71. See infra Parts II.B-C.
72. See Praveen Goyal, Congress Fumbles with the Internet, 21 H-Lv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
637, 638 (1998).
73. Id.
74. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
75. See id. at 864.
76. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 883.
77. See Weinberg, supra note 50, at 477-82; see also supra Part I.B.1.b.
78. See Julie Mason, Council Studies Drawing the Line Online at Library, HousToN
CHRON., Feb. 14, 1997, at 29, available in 1997 WL 6540295.
79. See Simon L. Garfinkel, Casting too wide a 'Net: Mayor's plan to block children's
access to porn ultimately sends wrong message, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20, 1997, at D4.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Mason, supra note 78, at 29.
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allow parents to block their children's access to certain sites. 83 These con-
trols rely on the existence of certain words in a web site to activate the
block.84 Unfortunately, this mechanism too can be overbroad. Words like
csex") or "breast" may trigger the control software, but "[w]hat you get is a
system that ends up blocking information on breast cancer and Middlesex,
England."85
B. Germany
Germany and the United States share a similar ideological and regula-
tory response to the Internet. Both countries have constitutional provisions
that guarantee free speech, but restrict some forms of expression, like
obscenity.86 Germany also regulates hate speech, as demonstrated by its
reaction to pro-Nazi propaganda on the Internet.87 Nevertheless, unlike the
United States, Germany has relied on threats of prosecution against ISPs to
force self-regulation.88
Germany's first confrontation with the Internet occurred in December
1995, when the Bavarian Justice Ministry discovered online discussion
groups that contained objectionable material.8 9 The Ministry notified
CompuServe, a U.S.-based ISP, and threatened prosecution, including
prison terms for company officials, if the groups were not blocked from
German access.90 The threat of prison terms for senior company officials
persuaded CompuServe to block access.9 1 However, since CompuServe's
technology could not provide differentiated blocking,92 the threat forced
CompuServe to block access for not only the 200,000 German subscribers,
but also its other four million customers in 147 countries.93
Examined closely, the German government's threat demonstrated its
commitment to holding ISPs responsible for Internet content. Accordingly,
Germany tacitly rejected screening software as a viable means of regulating
the Internet. Instead, the German government takes the moral high ground,
identifying objectionable content for the user. Thus, Internet users are not
"responsible for protecting their own sensibilities."94 In addition, by threat-
83. See Michael Meyer, A Bad Dream Comes True in Cyberspace, NEwswEEK, Jan. 8,
1996, at 65.
84. See Mason, supra note 78, at 29.
85. See id.
86. See Delacourt, supra note 61, at 208-15.
87. See Patrick G. Crago, Fundamental Rights on the Infobahn: Regulating the Delivery
of Internet Related Services Within the European Union, 20 HAStINGS INrA. & CoMP. L.
Rav. 467, 484-85 (1997); see also infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
88. See Delacourt, supra note 61, at 212-13.
89. See Nathaniel Nash, Holding Compuserve Responsible, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 15, 1996,
at D4 (describing Germany's confrontation with CompuServe and the ISP's subsequent
concessions).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Meyer, supra note 83, at 65.
93. See Amy Knoll, Any Which Way But Loose: Nations Regulate the Internet, 4 TUL. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 275, 287 (1996).
94. Delacourt, supra note 61, at 213.
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ening German prosecution, Germany imposed this morality on other
nations since CompuServe restricted access to the objectionable groups for
all of its users.95
German officials confronted objectionable content again when they
discovered neo-Nazi publications on the web. German prosecutors
informed three ISPs that they faced liability for publishing these works.96
T-Online, a German ISP owned by Deutsche Telekom, immediately
restricted access to the objectionable sites, but also cut off access to more
than 1500 innocent sites.97 The other two ISPs, U.S.-based America Online
and CompuServe, refused to restrict access to the sites. 98 In addition, pri-
vate "anti-censorship advocates at several United States universities
engaged in efforts to thwart the restrictive actions of T-Online" by creating
mirrors of the objectionable sites.99 The prosecutor, rationalizing his
attempts to identify objectionable content on the Internet as a German
crime, argued, "because [the neo-Nazi material is] available over the
Internet, it also can be called up in Germany ... [t]hen the scene of the
crime is all of Germany."100
T-Online admitted that restricting access to 1500 innocent sites was
not effective. 10 1 Nonetheless, the desire to escape liability drove it to take
strong measures to ensure compliance with German authorities. 10 2 The
German government prosecuted a CompuServe executive for distribution
of pornography and Nazi propaganda, but the Bavarian High Court
reversed the conviction.' 0 3 While the case was pending, the German gov-
ernment enacted the Information and Communications Services Act,
which sets ISP liability standards for allowing distribution of objectionable
material. 104
Germany's response to Internet regulation indicates a dilemma similar
to that of the United States. Both countries share a moral repugnance for
certain types of expression and have attempted to stop its distribution on
the Internet. The criminalization of user conduct or ISP liability, however,
proved ineffective in neutralizing Internet distribution.
95. CompuServe blocked access to the "alt.sex" discussion group hierarchy. See
Knoll, supra note 93, at 287.
96. See Delacourt, supra note 61, at 213. The works were written by Ernst Zuendel, a
Toronto-based neo-Nazi, and the Institute for Historical Review, a California-based
organization publishing Holocaust denial literature. See id.
97. See Knoll, supra note 93, at 288. One example of an "innocent" site was Deutsche
Bank Securities. See id.
98. See Delacourt, supra note 61, at 214.
99. Id. Mirror sites are duplicates of web sites, stored on the Internet independent of
the original. So, if a site has been restricted, an exact copy of the restricted content
would be available on the mirror site.
100. Silvia Ascarelli, Internet Racial Hatred Case Investigated, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26,
1996, at B2.
101. See Knoll, supra note 93, at 288.
102. See id. at 288-89.
103. See Sylvia Dennis, Court Overturns CompuServe Chiefs Porn Conviction, NEw.
sBYrEs, Nov. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 29943122.
104. See Sylvia Dennis, Germany Passes Anti-Nazi Internet Legislation, NEWSBYres, July
8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12351675.
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C. China
While the United States and Germany struggle to reconcile Internet
regulation with the basic freedoms granted to their citizens, China operates
in a political atmosphere where no such guarantees exist.10 5 Thus, China
gravitates toward draconian Internet regulation, and Chinese officials use a
heavy hand in determining what content is appropriate for public expo-
sure.106 On the positive side, China "seems to have a clear vision of how
development and use of the Internet should proceed .... China's simple,
yet extremely ambitious goal, can be described most succinctly as
'eliminat[ing] what is undesirable and keep[ing] what is good."'10 7 While
this is a rather vague goal by Western standards, China's political ideology
gives it powerful effect.
China conceptualizes the Internet as a tool for economic growth and
nothing more.108 Unlike Western countries, China is not especially con-
cerned with protecting speech, whether "regular" or on the Internet.10 9
Accordingly, China approaches Internet regulation differently from its
Western counterparts. In China, the government identifies desirable con-
tent.110 "Unlike the United States and Germany, which look to the vast
content of the Internet and ask what should be blocked, China asks what
should not be blocked."' 1 ' The government can and does prohibit most
web content beyond that used for normal business purposes. 112 Even if not
prohibited outright, China affords web sites no particular legal freedom,
allowing "several layers of governmental jurisdiction over Internet
control."113
China endorsed its Internet Management Rules (Rules) 114 during the
forty-second meeting of the State Council on January 23, 1996.115 Subse-
quently, China's Premier Li Peng signed the Rules into law.116 The Rules
describe the two methods China will use to control Internet content: first,
the Chinese government prohibited unregistered use of and unrestricted
content from the Internet, and second, the government limited physical
105. See John H. Taylor, III, The Internet in China: Embarking on the "Information
Superhighway" with One Hand on the Wheel and the Other Hand on the Plug, 15 DiciK. J.
INr'L L. 621, 629-31 (1997). See generally Scott E. Feir, Regulations Restricting Internet
Access: Attempted Repair of Rupture in China's Great Wall Restraining the Free Exchange of
Ideas, 6 PAC. RIM L. & PoI.'yJ. 361 (1997).
106. See Feir, supra note 105, at 376-82.
107. See Delacourt, supra note 61, at 215 (brackets in original) (citing Joseph Khan et
al., Chinese Firewall: Beijing Seeks to Build Version of the Internet that can be Censored:
Crackdown on Outside Views also Includes Satellite TV and Financial News Wires, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 31, 1996, at Al (quoting James Chu, "a Hong Kong computer scientist working
with the Chinese government" on China's Intranet)).
108. See id.; Knoll, supra note 93, at 297.
109. See Taylor, supra note 105, at 629-31.
110. See Delacourt, supra note 61, at 215.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 633-36.
113. Feir, supra note 105, at 368.
114. See Text of Interim Internet Management Rules, supra note 64.
115. See Feir, supra note 105, at 368.
116. See id.
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access to the Internet.117
Technically, the Chinese system routes the Internet through two gov-
ernment-controlled gateways.118 Then, firewall technology ' 19 restricts
links to the outside World Wide Web and basically creates China's national
Intranet.120 With its own Intranet, China's firewall functions as a barrier
so information cannot flow in or out, effectively creating a "digital Great
Wall of China." 121 Thus, Chinese ISPs provide access to the Chinese
Intranet, as opposed to the global Internet.122 The additional prohibitions
on unregistered use of and content from the Internet demonstrate China's
commitment to censorship. By controlling what citizens can upload to the
Internet, the government seeks to perpetuate the strict political controls
already in place.
Following promulgation of the Rules, the government reduced net-
work access to the Internet by forcing ISPs for the Intranet to use only
those Internet feeds approved by China's Ministry of Posts and Telecommu-
nications. 123 In August 1996, the government took a more drastic step by
blocking access to approximately one hundred web sites on the Internet
that Chinese officials "suspected of carrying spiritual pollution."124 The
restricted sites included many with information about Taiwan and Hong
Kong, pornography, and U.S. media coverage. 125 Finally, the government
ordered Chinese ISPs to self-regulate and restrict all objectionable content
accessible by their customers. 126 Compliance with this regulation facili-
tates the Chinese government's efforts to monitor and censor Internet
sites. 12 7
I. Problems with Current Regulatory Attempts
Although the United States, Germany, and China have taken steps to
regulate the Internet, all have had difficulty obtaining desired results. This
section will first examine the practical reasons for these difficulties, mostly
dealing with how the Internet's structure complicates any form of local-
ized, territorial attack. Then, it will explore the theoretical problems that
nations have yet to confront or solve, focusing on the choice as to who
117. See id.
118. See Sheila Tefft, China Attempts to Have Its Net and Censor It Too, CHRIsm'r Scl.
MONITOR, Aug. 5, 1996, at 1. See generally Graham Hutchings, Beijing Builds Barriers
Against an Electronic Democracy Wall, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 15, 1996, at 38, available in
1996 WL 3934967.
119. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.b.
120. See Michael Laris, The Price of the Deal, NEwswEEK, Dec. 9, 1996, at 44.
121. Louise Kehoe, Eagle Eye: A Tricky Decision, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996, at 14
(quoting Deborah Triant, President and CEO of Check Point Software Technologies).
122. See supra note 47.
123. See Taylor, supra note 105, at 633.
124. Wayne Arnold, Cyberpatrols: Censoring the New Isn't Easy, But It Can Be Intimi-
dating, AsiAN WALL ST.J., Sept. 11, 1996, at 1; see Kathy Chen, China and Vietnam Resist
A Common Foe: Internet, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1996, at 1.
125. See Chen, supra note 123, at 1.
126. See Taylor, supra note 105, at 636.
127. See id. at 636-37.
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regulates the Internet: private companies, 128 nations themselves, 129 or
international treaties. 130
A. Practical Problems with Regulating the Internet
Nations have great difficulty regulating the Internet because of its
global nature. Any attempt at regulation remains limited to the nation's
territorial boundaries. Thus, nations have several practical problems: (1)
the Internet's uniqueness; 131 (2) jurisdiction over offenders; 132 (3)
enforcement of regulations; and (4) policy concerns with regulation.
1. Uniqueness of the Internet
The Internet's uniqueness places nations on unfamiliar ground, pos-
ing difficulty for regulatory attempts. The Internet is a unique communica-
tions medium and technology.' 33 The Internet outstrips most other
communications media in terms of cost, speed, and power to disseminate
information. 134 Among the new forms of communication used on the
Internet are e-mail and newsgroups. 135
E-mail is the most frequently used function on the Internet. 136 With e-
mail, "[m]essages can be transmitted from one physical location to any
other location without degradation, decay, or substantial delay, and with-
out any physical cues or barriers that might otherwise keep certain geo-
graphically remote places and people separate from one another."137 In
addition, unlike regular mail, the cost and speed of e-mail are unrelated to
the distance a message must travel.138 This easy and instantaneous deliv-
ery leads to great difficulty restricting the flow of information across the
Internet.
Although less popular than e-mail, newsgroups allow users worldwide
to post and view messages, akin to a physical bulletin board. 139 In this
fashion, a posted message quickly reaches thousands of Internet users.140
Using newsgroups, "a person can act like a broadcaster; he can quickly and
128. See supra Parts II.B-C (discussing German and Chinese attempts to hold ISPs
liable for Internet content).
129. See supra Parts I1.A-B (discussing U.S. and German attempts to legislate against
objectionable content).
130. See Steven M. Hanley, International Internet Regulation: A Multinational
Approach, 16J. MARsHALL J. CoMPUrER & INFO. L. 997, 1009-11 (1998).
131. See generally Greg Y. Sato, Should Congress Regulate Cyberspace?, 20 HASTINGS
COMM. & ETr. UJ. 699, 707-10 (1998).
132. See generally Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 FED. COMM. J. 117 (1997).
133. See Sato, supra note 130, at 707-10.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See HAtNER & LYON, supra note 6, at 194.
137. Johnson & Post, supra note 32, at 1370-71.
138. See id.
139. See Sato, supra note 130, at 708-09.
140. See id.
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easily disseminate a message to a large audience."14 1 Thus, as Germany
discovered, 14 2 it is difficult to control information originating from the
Internet.
The Internet's predecessors, satellite television, radio, and telephone,
presently offer the same global capability as the Internet, but are still com-
paratively easy to regulate. 14 3 For example, unlike radio transmission, 144
the Internet cannot be jammed.
The Internet also derives its uniqueness as a communications medium
from its ease of access and low barriers to broadcasting. 14 5 The physical
tools required to connect to the Internet, are relatively inexpensive, consist-
ing of a simple stand-alone computer and phone line. 14 6
The most important differentiating characteristic of the Internet is its
extremely low barriers to entry. Because it uses other underlying physical
communications infrastructures, a new Internet enterprise need not build a
radio transmitter, string wire, or lay cable. All it takes to be an Internet pub-
lisher is a $2,000 personal computer and a $12.95 per month subscription
to an Internet service provider. All it takes to be an Internet service provider
is about $50,000, most of which goes for labor costs and a high bandwidth
connection between the terminal server and router into the larger Internet.
This is far less than what it takes to become a radio broadcaster, a print
publisher or a telephone service .... 147
Low barriers to entry pose a particular problem for China, which
seeks to regulate the Internet by controlling all points of entry into the
country and filtering Internet content through its ministries. 148 Citizens
can avoid China's Intranet controls by making a simple long-distance
phone call to an outside ISP; thereby receiving unfettered access to the
Internet. 149 China counteracts this difficulty not through technological
barriers but intimidation of its citizens. 150
The low barrier to entry does not, however, fully explain the difficul-
ties in Internet regulation. The Internet's unique technology renders
nations' regulations modeled after satellite and telephone technology inap-
plicable and ineffective. The varying experiences of the United States, Ger-
many, and China reflect the problems inherent in these technological
differences.
The United States encountered difficulties treating the Internet as an
extension of the telephone or press, cable, or radio medium. 15 ' Attempting
to impose content guidelines pertaining to indecency, the United States'
141. Id. at 709.
142. See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
144. See id. at 159.
145. See Perritt, supra note 60, at 158-61.
146. See id. at 161.
147. Id. at 161.
148. See Taylor, supra note 105, at 633.
149. See Wu, supra note 30, at 652.
150. See Taylor, supra note 105, at 638.
151. See supra Part II.A.
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actions met with disapproval and rejection by the Supreme Court. 152 The
Court recognized the Internet as a new technology, not subject to similar
limitations found in other communications media. 153 The Supreme
Court's distinctions between various forms of communication make it dif-
ficult for the United States to legislate all media as a whole.
Germany falls between the United States and China with regards to
treatment of the Internet as new technology. So far, Germany has used
existing laws to control Internet content. 154 After the CompuServe inci-
dent, however, Germany became the first Western democracy to indict and
convict an ISP executive for content the government deemed illegal. 155
Also, the German government enacted the Information and Communica-
tions Services Act, which set standards for Internet content uploaded or
downloaded to computers within German borders.' 56 Germany's end
result has left it in the same predicament as the United States: effective
legislation is hampered by differences in technology.
China, on the other hand, has carefully avoided treating the Internet
like other technologies. 57 Recognizing the inherent dangers of the Internet
as a medium for free speech, China has attempted to enforce strict controls
governing use.158 "[Tihe Chinese government has been encouraging access
to what is often an anarchic bastion of free expression and free flowing
information, concurrent efforts to restrict and regulate the flow of informa-
tion demonstrate the government's desire to maintain control."1' 59 Whether
these controls are working is debatable, but most critics agree that the reg-
ulatory efforts in China will fail eventually.' 60
2. Jurisdiction over the Offender
Jurisdiction and enforcement are entwined, and both are sources of
concern for nations attempting to regulate the Internet.' 6 ' A major issue in
Internet jurisdiction is determining whether a nation has the right to prose-
cute an offender who resides in one nation and complies with that nation's
laws, but violates another nation's laws because of the Internet's global
reach. For example, if a U.S. citizen posts on the Internet material permit-
ted by the CDA but deemed illegal in China, the issue becomes whether the
individual is subject to Chinese prosecution.
152. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864-74 (1997).
153. See id.
154. See supra Part II.B. (discussing Germany's efforts to hold CompuServe, America
Online, and T-Online responsible for violating hate speech laws).
155. See Dennis, supra note 103 (noting the CompuServe executive's subsequent
acquittal by an appellate court).
156. See Dennis, supra note 104.
157. See Taylor, supra note 105, at 631-37 (explaining Chinese efforts to promote
Internet use while regulating content).
158. See id at 630.
159. Id. (footnote omitted).
160. See id. at 637-39.
161. See Wilske & Schiller, supra note 131, at 125.
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The United States, in addition to holding corporations liable for cer-
tain material uploaded to the Internet, evades the jurisdictional issue by
holding its citizens responsible for what they post or download from the
Internet.1 62 Although this approach gives the United States more leeway in
prosecuting offenders, it leaves fewer offenders to prosecute. The Internet's
relative anonymity exacerbates this limitation due to the difficulty authori-
ties have tracking down offenders. 163
In its confrontation with CompuServe, Germany also had difficulty
tracking down offenders. 164 However, Germany encountered additional
problems when it attempted to hold CompuServe liable for users' wrongdo-
ing.165 Assuming German laws allowed the prosecution of any individuals
uploading Nazi propaganda to the Internet,166 Germany had subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction over the user, a U.S. citizen. Unfortunately, even if it had
jurisdiction, Germany had no way of enforcing its authority because, as a
U.S. citizen, the user was protected by the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.167 "The United States is hesitant to support extradition in
view of the United States citizens [sic] First Amendment rights, whereas
the German government desires to prosecute the United States citizen
under German law."1 68 Jurisdiction in Germany matters little, since there
is no way for Germany to enforce its interest.
China's approach appears to be a combination of U.S. and German
laws, but with a twist. In China, the user and ISP share liability for
improper content on the Internet. 169 Nevertheless, it is not liability that
effectively chills Internet content, but the fact that "[t]o the extent that the
Chinese government can frighten its people, they will succeed in their con-
trol."' 7 0 Although hampered by the same problems that the United States
and Germany encounter with extraterritorial jurisdiction,17 1 China may
frighten users and ISPs into compliance with regulations for its Intranet. 172
Currently, although "[e]very State has an obligation to exercise moder-
ation and restraint in invoking jurisdiction over cases that have a foreign
element, and they should avoid undue encroachment on the jurisdiction of
other States,"' 73 jurisdiction remains a contentious issue. It is one of the
stumbling blocks to international regulation of the Internet. Since ideology
strongly influences the type of regulation used to control the Internet, there
is little chance of an easy resolution.
162. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223(a-(h) (1996).
163. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges
to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 164243 (1995).
164. See Nash, supra note 89, at D4.
165. See Knoll, supra note 93, at 288-89.
166. But see Dennis, supra note 104 (noting that German Internet regulation only
extends to material uploaded from German-based computers).
167. See Hanley, supra note 129, at 1010.
168. Id.
169. See supra Part II.C.
170. Feir, supra note 105, at 384.
171. See id. at 376-82
172. See Taylor, supra note 105, at 638-39.
173. Wilske & Schiller, supra note 131, at 126.
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3. Enforcement of Regulations
Nations face difficulties enforcing regulations governing Internet use.
The enforcement provisions must be directed at the appropriate target.
Currently, Germany and China hold ISPs responsible for the content of
Internet sites, 174 while the United States and China aim liability at the
individuals that post objectionable content on the web.175 Both regulatory
regimes are flawed.
Holding ISPs responsible for Internet content raises a number of
problems. First, ISPs are not technically responsible for creating the con-
tent of Internet sites. These companies merely provide their subscribers
access to the Internet.1 76 The subscribers create the web sites. Also, "if the
ISPs were held accountable for information content, the efforts required to
censor the immense amount of material traveling across the Internet would
overwhelm ISPs."
17 7
Furthermore, holding ISPs liable for Internet content can have drastic
results. As Germany discovered, companies often take radical action to
limit responsibility when threatened with liability.178 This radical action at
one point shut down 1500 innocent web sites and cut off four million users
in 146 countries from discussion groups. 179 ISPs simply do not have the
technology to block only certain subscribers from content on the web.'8 0
Current technology only allows an all-or-nothing solution.' 8 ' Accordingly,
since each country has a different standard of tolerable speech and the ISPs
cannot block content based on the country of origin, ISPs would simply
apply the highest level of scrutiny to any objectionable site.' 8 2
On the other hand, holding individuals liable for the content of a web
site carries a different enforcement problem. As a global phenomenon, it is
very difficult and costly to track down specific Internet users that post
objectionable content. 183 "Traffic analysis[184 may not disclose the infor-
mation content, however, the source and destination can suggest certain
interests. Once again, the vast structure of the Internet renders this solu-
tion untenable."'18 5
The United States uses individual liability to regulate Internet content,
174. See supra Parts I.B-C.
175. See supra Parts II.A, C.
176. See supra note 74.
177. Hanley, supra note 129, at 1008.
178. See Knoll, supra note 93, at 287-89.
179. See id.
180. See Meyer, supra note 83, at 65.
181. See id.
182. See Delacourt, supra note 61, at 213.
183. See Hanley, supra note 129, at 1008 & n.62. Hanley calls this solution "patrol-
ling the Internet." Id.
184. "Traffic analysis" refers to tracking the movements of individuals on the Internet.
However, this technology is limited to tracking the web sites visited, not the content
accessed.
185. Hanley, supra note 129, at 1008-09 (footnote omitted).
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e.g. prohibiting individuals from downloading child pornography.' 86 Pre-
existing U.S. statutes 187 concerning the interstate transmission of obscen-
ity have been applied to users downloading such material from the
Internet;188 however, finding the individuals that traffic in child pornogra-
phy and obscenity is far more difficult than criminalizing such behavior.
China also attempts to control the Internet by regulating users. Article
13 of China's (Interim Internet Management) Rules lists as illegal activities:
transmitting information that is "prejudicial to state security;" leaking
"state secrets;" "produc[ing], retriev[ing], duplicat[ing], and dis-
seminat[ing] information prejudicial to public order;" and "pornographic
materials."189 However, "[d]efinitions of state security, state secrets, or
public order are not provided." 190 The broadness of this provision masks
its technical ineffectiveness. Although China may outlaw certain conduct,
like the United States, it must find a way to catch those responsible first.
4. Policy Concerns
Policy concerns behind Internet regulation generally coincide with the
nation's ideology. "Foreseeable problems arise in enforcing international
laws enacted to regulate the Internet since countries hold vastly different
political and social values."191 When nations examine Internet regulation,
they often evaluate degrees of control. For example, the constitutions of the
United States and Germany guarantee protection for certain behavior,
requiring inquiry into how much control of the Internet is constitutionally
permitted. 192 In the United States, the Supreme Court protects Internet
users by reviewing regulations for comportment with the Constitution and
striking down those which fail to pass Constitutional muster.193 But
"[f]reedom of speech is not a universally held belief. Problems inevitably
arise when a country such as Germany wishes to prosecute a United States
citizen for placing pro-Nazi propaganda on the Internet."194
While China does not protect certain freedoms like the United States
and Germany, it must also consider the degree to which it will regulate the
Internet. Nevertheless, instead of using personal freedoms to limit regula-
tion, the Chinese government regulates the entire Internet and limits per-
sonal access. 195 The Chinese government assumes the role of determining
186. See, e.g., Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121,
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26.
187. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1465 (1994).
188. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
820 (1996) (holding that 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1465 applied to a postal inspector who
downloaded obscene materials from a California electronic bulletin board).
189. Text of Interim Internet Management Rules, supra note 64, at art. 13.
190. Feir, supra note 105, at 371.
191. Hanley, supra note 129, at 1010.
192. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. I; GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 5 (F.R.G.).
193. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
194. Hanley, supra note 129, at 1010.
195. See supra Part II.C.
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the morality of Internet content, a constitutionally untenable position for
the United States and Germany.
B. Theoretical Problems with Regulating the Internet
While practical problems hinder nations' efforts, the difficulties with
Internet regulation do not stop there. Nations must also determine who
should regulate the Internet. The three choices are: (1) private regulation
by corporations, 196 (2) public regulation by nations, 197 and (3) regulation
by international law.198
1. Private Regulation by Corporations
Enforced through ISP liability, nations can regulate the Internet by
holding ISPs responsible for promulgating rules to conform subscribers'
web sites. The government would not need to track offenders or update
regulations for technological changes, leaving corporations responsible
instead. Currently, although the United States imposes some ISP liabil-
ity, 199 Germany and China both hold corporations primarily responsible
for Internet content.200
As nations find it difficult to enforce their laws against individuals in
other countries, nations' power over resident corporations is important.20'
Other nations are often unwilling to extradite citizens based on alleged web
offenses, since nations have different protections for free speech.202 None-
theless, a resident corporation usually will prove more responsive to threats
of prosecution because it has a tangible stake in the country. Since the
corporation has assets invested in the country, the threat of prosecution,
including confiscation of assets, can be severe, guaranteeing that the corpo-
ration will take action to forestall prosecution.20 3 Furthermore, assuming
that private corporations are profit-maximizing entities, they are necessa-
rily more responsive to technological shifts since profit margins drive their
competitive ability.20 4 Nations would no longer have to worry about spe-
cific laws becoming outdated as technology changes.
Nevertheless, allowing corporations to police the Internet does have its
drawbacks. Assuming again that corporations are profit-maximizing enti-
ties, their decisions may be governed by simple cost-benefit analyses, only
196. See supra Parts II.B-C (discussing German and Chinese attempts to hold ISPs
liable for Internet content).
197. See supra Parts II.A-B (discussing U.S. and German attempts to legislate against
objectionable content).
198. See Hanley, supra note 129, at 1009-11.
199. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (1996). Unlike Germany and China, the United States
enacted a provision allowing limited or no liability for ISPs that could demonstrate a
good faith effort to screen out underage users. See § 223(c); cf. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)
(1996) (limiting liability for ISP's role as speaker or publisher of user's posted material).
200. See supra Parts lI.B-C.
201. See Hanley, supra note 129, at 1010; see also supra Part III.A.2.
202. See id.
203. See Nash, supra note 89, at D4; see also Knoll, supra note 93, at 287-89.
204. In contrast, a government entity's motivation will be based on public interest,
not survival, and thus may not be as compelling.
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asking whether allowing access makes sense from a bottom-line perspec-
tive. Most nations can easily levy fines that affect the bottom-line, and cor-
porate executives will certainly be unwilling to endure prison terms for
their profit margin.20 5 Yet, as indicated by Germany's threats of prison
terms for CompuServe's officials, corporate response to threats often will
be overinclusive because the corporation will seek to eliminate any basis
for liability.20 6 Facing potential legal liability, corporations will tend to cen-
sor Internet content strictly.20 7 In the United States, at least, this govern-
ment-compelled censorship would infringe on the protections afforded by
the Constitution.20 8
Furthermore, from a policy perspective, holding corporations vicari-
ously liable for the actions of private individuals seems inappropriate when
it will not have any significant impact on those who upload objectionable
content to the Internet. Individuals need only shop in a favorable jurisdic-
tion for ISPs with deep pockets. Unfortunately, despite the inherent diffi-
culties with regulating the Internet through private corporations, it is the
most likely course of action. "[Tihe architecture of a flexible system which
supports both government censorship and self-regulation" is only possible
through one method: "the common thread being government control over
ISPs." 20 9
2. Public Regulation by Nations
While national regulation is the most popular reaction to Internet con-
trol, it is by no means the most effective. "Currently, each nation finds it
difficult, if not impossible, to control Internet transmissions past its bor-
ders .... -2 10 In the United States, in particular, government Internet regu-
lation has proven ineffective, 2 11 and the government is struggling to
reconcile Internet restrictions with the Constitution.2 12
One problem with nations regulating the Internet is that the legislative
process is too static. Internet technology changes quickly, and nations with
all of their institutional inertia cannot hope to keep pace. Another concern
is that nations may pass laws that attempt to regulate the Internet glob-
ally.2 13 "Internet metropolises have yet to seriously consider other nations
[sic] regulation efforts." 2 14 Such broad-based regulation occurred in Ger-
many when government pressure forced an ISP to shut down access to
many innocent web sites.215 As a result, Germany cut off access world-
205. See supra Part lI.B (discussing how Germany's threat of prison terms for Com-
puServe's executives galvanized the company to action).
206. See Nash, supra note 89, at D4.
207. See Knoll, supra note 93, at 287-89.
208. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
209. Hanley, supra note 129, at 1023.
210. Id. at 1022.
211. See supra Part II.A.
212. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
213. See Hanley, supra note 129, at 1013-15.
214. See id. at 1013-14.
215. See Knoll, supra note 93, at 287-89.
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wide.216 As The Economist protested, "When Bavaria wrinkles its nose,
must the whole world catch a cold?"217
Also, there are many practical problems intrinsic to nations regulating
the Internet. Nations often cannot exercise the jurisdiction necessary to
enforce their laws.218 Even when nations pass laws, they will have diffi-
culty tracking down and/or extraditing offenders.2 19 Finally, on a policy
level, most nations disagree as to the protection afforded certain
activities.220
However, while Germany and the United States struggle with national
regulatory regimes,221 China's system has been surprisingly effective.222
China heavily censors its own Intranet and limits Internet access to a few
ISPs.2 23 Although this system limits China's exposure to the Internet, many
critics find that "Chinese authorities have shown a considerable naivete
with regard to the Internet - the restrictions which they have imposed on
the use of the Internet are seemingly hollow."224 Nonetheless, China's cen-
sorship does not succeed through technological brilliance, but through
intimidation.225 Western democracies will not use intimidation to enforce
Internet control; thus effective regulation for them remains illusory.
3. Regulation by International Laws
"Currently, international law governing the Internet does not
exist."'226 International law has effectively regulated other modes of com-
munication, like satellite television and telephone networks. 227 Unfortu-
nately, these forms of communication are very different from the
Internet.228
While international law does offer some hope, there are many
unresolved issues. The problems with international law governing the
Internet ultimately trace back to ideological differences between nations:
free speech is not a universally held right, and pornography is not univer-
sally disparaged; nations simply have different standards for what they
deem appropriate.229 For example, China regulates everything, limiting the
216. See id.
217. Sex on the Internet, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 18.
218. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing jurisdiction over offenders).
219. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the enforcement of laws).
220. See supra Part III.A.4 (discussing policy concerns).
221. See supra Parts IL.A-B (examining the United States and Germany).
222. See supra Part II.C (examining China).
223. See Taylor, supra note 105, at 633.
224. Id. at 638.
225. See id. "The use of centralist means to censor the Net is doomed to failure, unless
you simply frighten people into silence." Simon Fluendy, Pandora's Box: Asian Regimes
Struggle to Keep a Lid on the Net, FAR E. ECON. REv., Sept. 26, 1996, at 71, available in
1996 WL-FEER 10569876.
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228. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the uniqueness of the Internet).
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Internet to business-specific purposes; 230 Germany prohibits neo-Nazi
propaganda;231 and the United States targets pornography.232 These dif-
fering standards and the unwillingness to compromise make international
regulation improbable. This ideological impasse would manifest itself in
attempts to enforce any international law regulating the Internet.233
Another counter-argument to international laws is that the judicial sys-
tem will develop an applicable interpretation given enough time.2 34 Also,
"[eighty percent] of the planet's population currently lacks access to basic
telecommunications technology. This calls into question whether the end
of the millennium is the appropriate time to harmonize legal systems for
the global information infrastructure, since only [twenty percent] of the
world population is participating."235 With this in mind, any international
agreement would bind countries and individuals who have not even exper-
ienced the possibilities of the Internet, let alone the consequences.
IV. Non-Regulation as the Solution
Non-regulation of the Internet could be considered a controversial
approach to Internet regulation. However, in light of the failed efforts to
impose any coherent control over information available on the Internet,236
it is better to allow the Internet to develop and evolve before hastily inter-
vening. When the Internet's growth has slowed and the effects of Internet
use are plain, only then can the law hope to create a proper regulatory
regime. For now, the governments of the world should allow the Internet to
develop, grow, expand, and realize its full potential. As one commentator
noted:
My point is about timing-when the balance should be drawn. There are
many who now see the extraordinary expressive and associational potential
that cyberspace offers. Most, however, do not. If the many prove correct, the
most will eventually see the same-as the space becomes more common, as
their children become transformed by it, as life takes root within it. But this
seeing will take time. It will require that individuals gain an experience with
this new space that gives them the sense of what this new space is. Only
230. See supra Part II.C.
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See supra Part II.A.
233. See supra Part II.A.3.
234. See Kristin Ashurst Hughes, Note, Copyright in Cyberspace: A Survey of National
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national Harmonization, 11 Am. U. J. IN'L L. & POL'Y 1027, 1063 (1996).
[T]he development of the information superhighway is just beginning, and will
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who question if an impetus for urgent harmonization of policies is preferable
given the option of allowing courts to develop laws over time, without interpreta-
tion of legislative policies that are not supported by practice and experience.
Id. (footnote omitted). This observation applies a Western view to Internet development,
relying on judicial review to harmonize Internet policy. This, of course, is time-consum-
ing and reactive, as opposed to proactive.
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236. See supra Part III.
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when this experience is common should we expect to be in a position to
understand its significance. When the technology, when the experience,
when the life in cyberspace presses us, only then should we expect law to
understand enough to resolve these questions rightly.2 37
The Internet's negative image has been indelibly imprinted on many
minds: the Internet is wild, a hotbed of pornography and criminal activity.
Accordingly, many people would believe any Internet regulation is better
than none. Nevertheless, conceptualizing the Internet as a source of objec-
tionable activity mischaracterizes most of the information available on the
Internet. The last section of this Note explores and critiques the arguments
made in favor of regulating the Internet and argues that some regulation is
not better than none at all.
A. Concerns with Non-Regulation
There are three main concerns that drive the desire for Internet regula-
tion: (1) the presence of objectionable content,2 38 (2) potential for criminal
activity,23 9 and (3) difficulty maintaining state sovereignty.2 40 Generally,
regulatory regimes target these areas. Nations intervene to ensure that
what their citizens view or use will not inflict harm or disrupt government
functions.
1. Objectionable Content
Pornography, hate speech, and other examples of objectionable con-
tent certainly exist on the web, and many nations seek to regulate what
their citizens see.2 4 1 Nations enforce a certain morality where govern-
ments determine their citizens' appropriate use of, access to, and participa-
tion in media or activities, sometimes at the behest of the citizens
themselves.24 2 These citizens and their governments fear that the Internet
provides easy access to objectionable content and enables its mass
dissemination. 243
However, the fear greatly exaggerates the threat.2 44 "[M]illions of peo-
ple.., regularly use the Internet and come in contact with virtually no
sexual content whatsoever." 24 5 While objectionable content exists, the
237. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE LJ. 1743, 1752 (1995).
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French president).
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Internet user decides what sites to visit and what sites to avoid.246
In response to the concern about objectionable material available to
children, many ISPs distribute software with parental controls.247 This
software is arguably more effective than legislation that imposes the views
of paternalistic government officials. Since it allows parents to determine
the boundaries of what children should and should not see, adults would
have unrestricted access to the Internet.
Parental control software may help dispel the belief that the Internet is
"wild."248 Contrasted with ponderous and often blundering national legis-
lation, parental controls provide a relatively painless way to regulate user
activity.24 9 Therefore, since the Internet's beneficial uses far outweigh the
actions of individuals intent on uploading objectionable material, stunting
the growth of the Internet through ill-advised regulations would be a hasty
response to an illusory problem.
2. Criminal Activity
"A further concern voiced by proponents of Internet regulation is that
without some form of intervention the Internet will become a haven for
criminal activity far more serious than engaging in disfavored expres-
sion."250 The key issue is whether the Internet provides technology-savvy
criminals unlimited opportunities to take advantage of average citizens. But
"[1]ike the hazards of objectionable on-line content, however, the hazards of
on-line crime tend to be exaggerated."251
While Internet crime does exist,2 52 most often it would be categorized
as larceny253 or fraud.254 Better encryption technology and further educa-
tion for the unwary as to the dangers of Internet communications would
resolve most concerns. Moreover, it is difficult to see why an individual,
already knowingly committing a crime, would view further. national regula-
tion as a deterrent.
246. See Steven Levy, No Place for Kids?: A Parents' Guide to Sex on the Net, NEWSWEEK,
July 3, 1995, at 48.
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3. Sovereignty Concerns
Sovereignty concerns also drive nations to regulate the Internet.
25 5
Nations zealously guard their sovereignty and perceive the Internet as a
threat.25 6 One reason for this distrust is the Internet's global nature.
The Internet is a revolutionary phenomenon. It is not just a technology, but
a way of organizing and connecting human activity, which emphasizes
decentralization, specialization, and global cooperation. It is not merely a
means for facilitating existing market and political institutions, but a way of
redefining them altogether .... Unlike traditional sovereign states which are
tied to geographic boundaries, the Internet is inherently global and indiffer-
ent to geographical political boundaries ....
... International law must deal with the Internet.
25 7
By transcending national boundaries, the Internet raises a host of con-
cerns for nations. Totalitarian political regimes can no longer insulate their
population from information disseminated by the outside world. Unlike
other technologies, Internet access is relatively easy, a computer and phone
line reveal a realm of unregulated information.25 8 In sum, nations fear that
the Internet will deprive the government of substantial political control.
However, totalitarian regimes are not the only nations concerned with
Internet regulation. Both the U.S. and E.U. governments must ensure that
the Internet and citizens' use comport with established legislation and
national constitutions.25 9 Since most of these countries already have com-
plex economic linkages that secure informational freedom, they are not
concerned that the Internet will destabilize the government. 260 Instead,
these countries worry about the tangible issues of Internet crime and the
continuing enforcement of legislation against activities that are already
heavily regulated, like gambling and pornography.
B. Benefits of Non-Regulation
The biggest myth associated with non-regulation of the Internet is that
the web will run out of control; criminal activity and objectionable content
will flourish. As explored earlier, however, the most common complaints
about the Internet cannot be solved by government regulation.2 6 1 In fact,
government regulation would make little or no difference in preventing
these problems.
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Furthermore, non-regulation does not mean the government must
turn a blind eye to everything on the Internet. Internet abuse can be dealt
with under preexisting regulations. Also, Internet transactions can be
taxed, with rates differing based on the content of web sites. 26 2 Non-regula-
tion would avoid confrontations with other nations over jurisdiction,
enforcement, and ideological differences, but would leave room for the
Internet users to self-regulate based on perceived national standards.
C. The Internet and Self-Regulation
Demonstrated by its response to parental concerns about objectiona-
ble content, Internet users and ISPs have been regulating themselves.263
Governmental pressure, the mere threat of legislation, is many times the
only catalyst Internet users and ISPs need to restrict or refrain from con-
duct. "Persons in countries which heavily regulate or monitor the Internet
may also voluntarily restrict their communications to avoid criminal sanc-
tions."264 More specifically, in China, "[slelf-censorship on the Internet
will occur as it does in the print media with journalists wishing to avoid
governmental scrutiny. '265 Internet users and ISPs are responsive and
adaptable, acting much like any free market. Thus, external pressures can
certainly influence behavior more effectively than overbearing and territo-
rially confined regulations.
Conclusion
This Note began by comparing the Wild West of the United States in
the 1800s with the electronic frontier of the Internet today. The similarities
exist: little regulation and numerous new opportunities. Yet this is where
the similarities end. Whereas the United States successfully tamed the
West with federal regulation that controlled its development, a similar
approach to taming the Internet is unworkable. Periodic government
enforcements, like Germany's showdowns with CompuServe and America
Online 266 and the United States' duel with the ACLU over the CDA,267 are
the first haymakers in the brawl. Each nation strives to stay abreast of ever-
changing Internet technology; however, increasingly, governments are los-
ing these fights. Despite the availability of several regulatory tools, no previ-
ously used methods are suited regulating the Internet.
Nations cannot enlist ISPs to regulate the Internet because no corpora-
tion can effectively control the content subscribers access. It is too simple
to circumvent efforts by ISPs to restrict access to objectionable sites.268
262. The government currently taxes cigarettes highly; similarly high rates here could
amount to an "e-sin" tax that encourages web sites to restrict objectionable content.
263. See supra note 248 and accompanying text; see also Knoll, supra note 93, at 278.
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268. See supra Part lI.B (describing the use of mirror sites to counteract T-Online's
blocking of objectionable web sites).
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Thus, holding private corporations responsible for regulating Internet con-
tent leads to results like what transpired in Germany, where companies
overreacted to government threats and barred access to "innocent" sites in
an effort to divest liability.2 6 9 Private corporations may be responsive to
the continuing development of technology, but are not large enough to
wield any discernable influence over Internet users.
Nor can national regulation effectively govern the Internet. The United
States encountered difficulty in prescribing broad means to restrict
Internet content, unenviably captive to its own Constitution.2 70 On the
other end of the spectrum, China's forced censorship is at best a temporary
sandbag wall before the floods of information force their way into the
country. China controls its people's Internet access more through fear and
intimidation than by regulation of technology. 27 1
International laws are probably the most effective way to enforce
Internet regulations, but the likelihood of international consensus remains
slim. Even among the three leading nations, there is little concurrence as to
how much free speech to tolerate.2 72 The United States, Germany, and
China cannot possibly agree on content restrictions, much less if countries
like Singapore and India were involved.
The simplest, albeit most frightening, solution leaves the Internet
unregulated. While seemingly shocking and morally lax, non-regulation
prevents overbroad application of laws that will hinder the growth and
development of the Internet. Nations can scramble to tailor laws that will
govern the Internet, but the Internet's infrastructure adapts to avoid such
localized laws quickly. The Internet's global nature makes it impossible to
control and impossible to damage; the Internet was designed to be immune
to catastrophes and invulnerable to shut down.2 73 Similarly, Internet regu-
lation may be seen as an attack and, as such, will be circumvented. While
nations try to keep pace with this ever-changing technology, the world's
governments may be doomed to haplessly chasing the Internet into the
sunset.
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